We set out to create an assessment and situational awareness tool for incident response. Extracting the risk assessment expertise and creating a systemic step-by-step workflow that could be followed by non-experts was challenging; however, what proved to be even more difficult was the mapping of that workflow to a common, natural language used by non-experts while still supporting the incident response. We at the Digital Intelligence and Investigation Directorate (DIID) have developed a way to maintain the velocity of incident response through the creation of a feed-forward decision support system to assist a security responder deal with the scale and challenges of assessing risk in critical information systems. Unfortunately, many applications fall short of expectations because the technology is used inappropriately: the wrong tool applied in the wrong way. Taking interaction techniques combined with a decision support system and applying them to one particularly demanding areasecurity incident response -leads to the conclusion that there is a proper and formal way to approach maintaining situational awareness in this complex domain.
INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructures are among the most significant technical systems that influence the normal operation of any commercial or industrial sector. Their importance is due to the type of facilities/utilities that they provide. Without the proper operation of infrastructure systems, the function of other reliant systems would be disrupted. Increasing awareness of largescale attacks on critical infrastructures and information systems in terms of their frequency, disruption on productivity and financial loss has motivated organizations and law enforcement officials to invest in their security and better prepare for dealing with such incidents by establishing training and purchasing tools to conduct system assessments. These assessments involve monitoring, malware detection, and digital situational awareness evaluations. With the increase in the complexity of the system, the approximation of the degree of effectiveness of each component becomes time-consuming, complicated, and at times impossible. The main method of investigation of critical infrastructures is to interview the infrastructure owners to obtain information about the current status of the systems, analyze it and then identify vulnerabilities, controls, and mitigations. Based on this understanding, a security response plan can be established to address various vulnerabilities, risks, and/or threats to ensure uninterrupted, continuous operation of the critical infrastructure. It is understandable that the result of this process would only shed light on the types of failure that are a clear result of a breakdown or malfunction of a system. Many of the possible risks for system failure are detected in this approach, but not all of the consequences are visibly perceived and understood.
Proper risk mitigation strategies can be proposed and prioritized based on the three metrics of the identified vulnerability, the control that is in place to address the vulnerability, and applying an effective mitigation. 1 Each of these can be weighted and a suitable strategy can be selected to enhance infrastructure protection according to the priorities of the infrastructure owner. Such capabilities allow for incident response that results in recovery of a system, getting the critical systems back online, as well as collaboration with law enforcement to pursue criminal prosecution. However, large-scale distributed cyber-attacks exist. They are often characterized by a coordinated group of adversaries that attack multiple sites and organizations. In these attacks adversarial motivations range from demonstrating hacking skills to criminal intent for financial gain, and specific targets range from intellectual property or sensitive data theft to disruption of network services of utility companies. These attacks are overwhelming to organizations attempting to comprehend and respond on their own. To address this in a strategic direction, we must focus on the understanding of the dynamic behavior of the critical infrastructure systems. We need to address the many paths of infrastructure process and operation through which we can identify any causes for instability. This capability allows us to focus on the discovery of paths that may cause catastrophic failures into the system. An example of a large-scale distributed attack and the motivational use case is an attack known as Stuxnet, a computer worm discovered in June 2010 that is believed to have been created by the United States and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. 2 Stuxnet initially spread via Microsoft Windows, and targeted Siemens industrial software and equipment. It was not the first time hackers targeted industrial systems 3 , but it was the first discovered malware that spied on and subverted industrial systems 4 , and the first to include a programmable logic controller (PLC) rootkit. 5 In response to the infection, Iran assembled a team to combat it. With more than 30,000 IP addresses affected in Iran, the infection spread fast and the problem had been compounded by Stuxnet's ability to mutate. Iran set up its own systems to clean up infections and advised against using the Siemens SCADA antivirus since it was suspected that it was embedded with codes updating Stuxnet instead of eradicating it. 6 The incident assessment and security plan process for Stuxnet substantiated new requirements and challenges for dealing with large-scale multisite attacks in a collaborative manner. There is a need to develop a tool for effective assessment of critical systems and creating security plan tasks by sharing information and resources with relevant participants.
One of the major barriers to the identification of the risk in critical information systems is that they are mostly of "low probability, high impact" in nature. 7 To understand and identify the behavior of an infrastructure with this categorization, we can analyze infrastructure behavior using machine learning on aggregated assessments of smaller infrastructure attributes against a critical mass of data. This understanding allows the analysis of critical information systems response to catastrophic events.
Forging coordination across assessments is a major challenge for responding to these attacks. Not only are organizations often unaware that other organizations might have been "hit," they also don't know where to obtain outside assistance. Second, since the coordination would need to take place only after an incident occurs, involve multiple security incident responder's, and last for the duration of the response, they need to be short term and flexible, so relying upon preexisting relationships between the organizations is unlikely. Third, the assessments need to deal with data and information that is sensitive in nature, such as network diagrams, logs, e.g., across institutional boundaries with user information in them that faces issues of security and privacy, as well as interaction with law enforcement.
These aspects of the assessment lead to several challenges that must be addressed when designing an assessment application. First, the application must provide a means for managing the processes for assessment and security plan by the incident responders of the collaborating sites and/or organizations. Second, in order to manage the tasks the organizations must provide a means to share information and resources. Third, the application must provide trusted information and data management with effective access control given the sensitive nature of the assessments.
Our proposed application, CERT Assessment Tool, incorporates lessons learned from Stuxnet and suggests an effective assessment framework, that comprises of a system model as well as a system design and implementation that allows multiple incident responders to actively collaborate for investigating, planning, and responding to critical infrastructure protection. While the proposed assessment and security plan system is distributed in nature, it is centrally managed by a trusted platform, the CERT Large Scale Analysis Platform (LSAP). The system model for the assessment and security plan process defines the roles, responsibilities and processes undertaken by multiple organizations (including law enforcement) to achieve full assessment and incident response. The system design carefully addresses security and privacy of the data (e.g., network diagrams, site images, edge data) and messages (e.g., emails, push notifications, alerts) exchanged across organizations during the assessment and event process. The security architecture provides identity-based and rolebased authorization to facilitate sharing and collaboration according to organizational policies and trust relationships. The application implements roles and processes for the mitigation of system vulnerabilities, details a response plan, and identifies contacts for the coordinated response and provides adequate security and privacy.
Our approach builds on several well-known principles for effective assessment using machine learning and decision support systems, as well as collaboration. For trust establishment we rely on an incentive-based approach where organizations participate so they can learn more about vital critical information systems vulnerability information and obtain access to tools and resources in order to respond to and recover from attacks. Furthermore, we use an organizational access policy enforcement approach so that organizations providing value in the identification and response process can collectively define important attributes such as system vulnerabilities, controls, mitigations, the type of attack, and pattern identification across multiple site assessments. For managing tasks and processes we focus on identifying and indexing areas of interest that warrant assessment and integrate them in a well-defined process workflow for each site. For managing data and information we use role based access control with the least privilege principle in mind within the CERT LSAP. We use these principles to design a framework that addresses this important problem of identifying risk of critical information systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we present lessons learned from Stuxnet. In Section Three (III) we discuss the requirements and approach. In Section Four (IV) we specify the process model and prototype implementation, and we conclude in Section Five (V).
II. STUXNET: LESSONS LEARNED

A. Motivating Scenario
The motivating scenario is an attack by an individual or a group against sites and organizations across multiple countries. A prime example, and our motivating use case, is a computer worm discovered in 2010 believed to have been created by the United States and Israel against Iran's nuclear facilities. Stuxnet is the first discovered malware that spies on and subverts industrial systems. This worm then spreads indiscriminately, but includes a highly specialized malware payload that is designed to target only Seimens supervisory control and data acquisition systems that are configured to control and monitor specific industrial processes 8 . Different variants of Stuxnet targeted five Iranian organizations, with the probable target widely suspected to be uranium enrichment infrastructure in Iran; Symantec noted in August 2010 that 60% of the infected computers worldwide were in Iran. 9 Siemens stated that the worm had not caused any damage to its customers, but the Iran nuclear program, which uses embargoed Siemens equipment procured secretly, has been damaged by Stuxnet. 
B. Attackers Advantages
In the case of Stuxnet, the attacker had detailed information about the supporting infrastructure at the site. Figure 1 shows these supporting systems, which included:
• Initial Infection. Stuxnet can enter an organization through an infected removable drive. When plugged into a computer that runs Windows, Stuxnet infects, then hides.
• Update and Spread. If the computer is on the Internet, Stuxnet may try to download a new version of itself. Stuxnet then spreads by infecting other computers, as well as any removable drives plugged into them.
• Final Target. Stuxnet seeks out computers running Step 7, software used to program Siemens controllers. The controllers regulate motors used in centrifuges and other machinery. While the computers in a secure facility may not be on the network, they can be infected with a removable drive. After infecting a controller, Stuxnet hides itself. After several days, it begins speeding and slowing the motors to try to damage or destroy the machinery. It also sends out false signals to make the system think everything is running smoothly.
III. REQUIREMENTS AND APPROACH
A. Requirements
In dealing with large-scale attacks, Stuxnet being an example, the critical information systems assessment and response process faces three kinds of challenges. First, it is hard to establish adequate levels of trust between the involved organizations and security incident responders. Organizations are reluctant to share information and communicate when effective response to such attacks requires them to share information and data (e.g., network diagrams, logs). The core issues behind the reluctance are security and privacy.
Second, even after establishing adequate levels of trust, managing all the tasks and processes in the assessment and response plan is extremely difficult. A critical mass of tasks and activities must be coordinated--detecting the vulnerability, determining if an adequate control is in place for that system, identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities, sharing the response plan, collaborative decision making, and information sharing and analysis across the team of incident responders according to how many site assessments are involved.
Third, at the core of the assessment and response plan process are the site administrators who own the critical information systems. These sites are large in size and have varying site representatives across different organizations. The assessment and response plan effort of all of the sites involved of this data will need to be managed for the duration of the event and/or site assessment.
B. Approach
In this paper, we propose a practical approach of defining a system model to collect, analyze, and build a response plan in a trusted assessment application. We use the cloud storage to keep a huge volume of critical information systems data and process it to find the system vulnerabilities. As we already operate the secured CERT Large Scale Analysis Platform (LSAP), we can scale this already existing system to work as a secure data store in the cloud using the security architecture and describe the system implementation to address all of these requirements. The proposed system model comprises two components: 1) a Roles and Responsibilities Model that defines the entities involved in the assessment and security plan, their responsibilities and their interactions and 2) a Process Model that defines the various phases of the assessment and security plan process as well as the execution of responsibilities in these phases. Combining together these components will ensure that the assessment and security plan team members will be able to effectively manage the required tasks. In particular, the system model effectively integrates the technical incident assessment and response process in a multi-site collaborative manner. The following risks are minimized by this system model: missed or unassigned responsibilities, overlapping responsibilities, unclear reporting functions in a site as well identified contacts for each critical information system.
IV. PROCESS MODEL AND PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We propose a process to support the assessment and response plan process. We describe a four-tier model that represents the process an incident assessor/responder goes through for a site. These phases are illustrated in Figure 2 . The assessment process is assumed to be executed at web user interface layer of CERT Assessment Tool which runs as a Web Application. 
A. Site/Event Assessment
The primary goal of the assessment phase is to identify all of the critical information systems of a site or event and develop a response plan to mitigate risk based on an assessment and lessons learned from prior experience. In a given site or event, the Site Assessor leads the effort by creating a response team. Tasking and training of all individuals and creating situational awareness of the systems that comprise the site or event are itemized. Detailed information is collected (system name, characteristics, contact person, vulnerabilities, controls and mitigations) that specifies that status for each critical information system and also for mitigation readiness if an incident occurs. This also contains information about how much information can be shared with outside parties, e.g., law enforcement and other security incident responders. Taking steps to prevent intrusions of critical information systems from occurring in the first place is also an important part of the preparation phase. Site Assessors follow the completion of this set of data for each system to ensure the security of the critical information systems.
B. Site/Event Aggregation
After conducting a critical information systems assessment of a site or event, prioritizing the list of the critical information systems becomes a major concern for the Security Incident Responder. At the same time, the Assessor starts the important task of creating the response plan. A comprehensive report is shared with all of the site security incident responders to ensure they are informed of what to do in case a critical information system is compromised.
C. Site/Event Analysis
Once the Site/Event network initial assessment is over, it is important to identify the lessons that can be learned from the assessment to mitigate any vulnerabilities or handling of any incidents. A meta-profile containing the reduced critical review of the entire process is placed in order to generate rules or steps for creating better preparedness that may include modifying policy or processes, making changes to the response plan, number of support personnel, etc. The security incident responder may deploy additional mitigations to strengthen the policies, process, and performance of the assessment initiative, as well as compare this to other site or event assessments that are happening simultaneously.
D. Collaborative Response/Correlation
The key to prepare for an assessment for multi-site is the existence of an application that supplies communication about the sites/events. This application must provide analysts space to analyze the relevant data sets, make their observations, and create a collective response.
As part of its day-to-day operations, the CERT Assessment Tool Administrator reviews an aggregated analysis of the individual reports at various sites in its purview. The Administrator determines the level of response, rules or messaging needed based on this aggregated information. Once the Super Administrator generate rules or steps for creating better preparedness which may include modifying policy or processes, making changes to guidance questions, or expert push notifications, etc.
E. Policy/Rule Application
Data analysis is a crucial part of the assessment process. Availability of data from multiple sites/events opens up the possibility of performing cross-site analysis to establish links among events happening at individual sites. This analysis is performed by the CERT Assessment Tool Administrator and other subject matter experts and requires a critical mass of data to prove benefit to individual Sites/Events for policy guidance and rule generation. Duis eget arcu vel justo dignissim dignissim sed at lectus. Donec hendrerit, magna ac molestie laoreet, sem urna congue tellus, in accumsan nisl velit eu augue. Mauris consequat iaculis aliquam. Vestibulum semper ultricies viverra. Nunc vel cursus augue. Sed ante felis, rhoncus a tincidunt ut, varius ac turpis. Vivamus ultricies eleifend ligula, fringilla tempor nibh iaculis at. Sed enim orci, feugiat vitae faucibus eu, gravida vitae tortor. Etiam pharetra ultrices venenatis. Fusce nisl dolor, luctus quis interdum vel, facilisis nec enim. Nam nec adipiscing urna. Morbi justo augue, auctor vitae dictum nec, iaculis eu turpis. Curabitur vitae arcu a nibh blandit blandit. Vivamus mauris purus, egestas quis auctor et, pharetra nec odio. Fusce elementum faucibus risus, ut vulputate tellus mattis nec. 
F. Site/Event Strategy
Once the assessment and response plan is over, appropriate steps are taken by the Site Administrator and Site Responder to mitigate any risks. The policy and rules developed in the assessment stage are then presented to disseminate the information via push notifications. Depending on the policy, the information may be shared with other organizations that have systems that have been assessed or responded to by previous site/event Assessments. Finally, like participating sites, CERT Assessment Tool will also have a policy on recording reports.
At the core of our approach for collaborative assessment and security plan is an environment that allows Site Assessors and Super Administrators to instantiate analyst Site/Event workspaces and collaborations. Since the information is sensitive or classified in some cases, security for the collaboration is essential.
To limit access to CERT Assessment Tool, we use strong two-factor authentication and to limit access to authorized data and resources between and within Sites/Events we use rolebased access control.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Organizations with critical information systems face largescale distributed attacks on a regular basis. Based on lessons learned in dealing with attack on these systems and the realizations that the complexity and frequency of such attacks are increasing, it is imperative to develop a capability that allows effective collaborative assessment and security plans that support multiple organizations and security incident responders. To accomplish this we propose the prototype implementation that would provide the ability to execute this assessment process led by CERT Assessment Tool. The process model defines an appropriate workflow to conduct critical information system assessments. We define all of the necessary sub-systems (system name, characteristics, contact person, vulnerabilities, controls and mitigations) to collect and conduct the assessment. We describe a process that provides collaboration across sites and resources for undertaking the assessment and security plan while enforcing security requirements. Mauris consequat iaculis aliquam. Vestibulum semper ultricies viverra.
Mauris consequat iaculis aliquam. Vestibulum semper ultricies viverra.
